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Honor the Baloch, Buy the Pushtun: Stereotypes, Social Organization and History in Western Pakistan

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Frontier Wars are but the surf that marks the edge and the advance of the wave of civilization.
—Lord Salisbury, 1892

Like the jellyfish, the absence of a backbone to be broken was the greatest defense of the tribes against the waves of state power which beat upon them.
[Yapp 1983:186]

Introduction

An aphorism occasionally heard today purportedly summarizes the approach the British took to govern the parts of the empire that now constitute Pakistan. Their formula, it says, was 'Rule the Punjabis, intimidate the Sindhis, buy the Pushtun, and honor the Baloch.'[1] While doing fieldwork in Quetta, the capital of Pakistani Balochistan and, in recent years the setting for several incidents of serious ethnic conflict, I found that current stereotypes about Baloch and Pushtun held by members of both groups about themselves and each other reflect essentially the same attitudes as those expressed in the aphorism.[2] Edwin Ardner (1989:24–6) has suggested that such consistency

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[1] This version was told to me by the nephew of the head of the Baloch Jamalli tribe. Duncan (1987:16) provides a version which differs from his in an interesting way: 'Rule the Punjabis, intimidate the Sindhis, buy the Pushtun, and befriend the Baloch.'

[2] The ethnonym 'Baloch' refers in this paper to the members of the broader Baloch society. It therefore includes both Balochi- and Brahui-speaking subgroups. 'Pushtun' is the southern dialectical variant of the ethnonym (the northern variant being 'Pukhtun') used by those frequently referred to as Pathans to refer to themselves.

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can come from a number of structural relationships including those manifested among the people (or categories of people) involved in actual events, the way those events are recorded, and the way they are communicated.

Stimulated by critiques of orientalism and emphasizing the power of discourse, recent studies of the colonial period have tended to focus on the second and third of these relationships. Considerable effort has been made to reveal and deconstruct the 'essentialist' categories through which colonial administrators knew their Indian subjects.[3] That those same subjects make use of similar categories in the post-colonial era can then be explained as the internalization of orientalist and colonialist notions (Breckenridge and van der Veer 1993:11). This view is limiting because it exaggerates (even essentializes) the uniqueness, uniformity, and power of colonial discursive practices. As recent critiques and revisions of post-orientalist approaches have pointed out, essentialist categories were current in South Asia prior to colonialism, and Indian categories were adapted and reified by Europeans in complex ways, not all of which were essentializing.[4] Indeed, studies emphasizing cognitive and psychological approaches suggest that all individuals and groups define themselves relative to others and in doing so create more or less exclusive categories.[5]

This paper, therefore, focuses primarily on the social relationships that are enacted through but also despite linguistic categories. It examines Baloch and Pushtun history and social organization for an explanation of stereotypes about them and suggests that those stereotypes reflect different configurations of hierarchy and equality within the two groups.[6] The first part of the paper presents a brief historical sketch of British India's efforts to delimit and pacify its western frontier. This historical narrative provides a background in

[3] Said 1979:204, 321; Inden 1986:403; Pandey 1990:12.

[4] Ahmad 1992:184, Rogers 1994:14; Ludden 1992:253, 277; 1993:261.

[5] Mahmood and Armstrong 1992; Kearney 1984:68–78; Comaroff 1987:302; Wright 1991; Hirschfeld 1988.

[6] This study thus resembles Pandey's (1990) examination of the economic and social factors that underlay the colonial stereotype of the Julaha (Muslim weavers) of central India as religious fanatics. Unlike Pandey, I do not consider stereotypes to be proof of an essentializing discourse. As simplified generalizations, stereotypes differ in their formulation and utilization, and may or may not be categorical or malicious. The argument of this paper is that stereotypes reflect (albeit at times in distorted ways) aspects of the history, social position, and route to mobilization of the group to which they refer (Lieberson 1985:128–31; Williams 1989:431).




Fig. 1. Major Ethno-linguist Groups, Pakistani Balochistan and Region. (Mixed groups indicated by alternating tones.)

which to view colonial and contemporary stereotypes of the people of the frontier region. The second section presents some common stereotypes of Pushtun and Baloch societies as well as the personal qualities of the members of those societies. The following sections examine some of the structural, ecological, and historical factors underlying these stereotypes. The final section examines the continuities and transformations in relevant aspects of Baloch and Pushtun society in the contemporary political-economy of the region.

British Relations with the Tribes of the Western Frontier

As the government of British India extended its authority westward during the nineteenth century, the main discourse through which it

and the British government established policy was the need to defend India against external enemies. For much of that period the most serious threat was seen to come from Russia acting alone or in concert with internal opponents to British rule, and, therefore, security and the most economical means of maintaining it were the main issues in debates over what the western boundaries of the Indian empire should be (Yapp 1980:15–20). The two fundamental positions in the debate were known as 'close borders' and the 'forward policy'. Advocates of close borders argued for holding a defensive position along the immediate boundaries of the empire, variously the Indus River or the base of the mountains to the west of it; while advocates of the forward policy called for extending the British presence further west, as far as the Oxus River and Herat in some versions, in order to create protective buffer zones (*ibid.*:481; Awan 1985:95).

Establishing such borders meant dealing not only in the lofty realms of international diplomacy but also with the turbulent on-the-ground reality of the independent, contentious, and at times predatory Pushtun and Baloch tribes inhabiting the mountains west of the Indus (see map). Given their region's marginal productivity and the important trade routes which passed through it, plunder had long made an important contribution to the subsistence of those tribes.[7] The region's cultural ecology also makes direct control by outsiders problematic, and so in dealing with the frontier tribes the British found themselves caught in the same entanglements as those faced by their predecessors, the Mughals and Sikhs.[8]

After the first attempt at a forward policy ended with the annihilation of a British army as it retreated from Kabul in December 1841, the government implemented a close borders policy which called for restraint in military penetration of tribal territories beyond the areas where the colonial legal system was in force. In the Afghan border region this meant dealing with the tribes outside areas of direct rule by paying allowances for good behavior, manipulating intertribal relations, and using punitive expeditions, blockades, and *baramtas*[9] in response to offenses (Caroe 1986:348–50; Spain 1979:11). In Balo-

[7] Arlinghaus 1988:54; Embree 1979:33; Hughes 1877:45–7, 79; Lindholm 1980:353.

[8] Arlinghaus 1988:314–16; Richards 1993:170–1; Singh 1963:281–6.

[9] Caroe defines *baramta* as 'the seizure of persons, animals, or property belonging to a tribe or individual at fault, in order to bring pressure for restitution' (Caroe 1986:350).

chistan and Sindh it led to a similar policy of 'counter-raiding' (Caroe 1986:330) as well as bolstering the head of the Baloch tribal confederacy, the Khan of Kalat, so that he could police his subjects (Embree 1979:39; Awan 1985:151).

The close borders approach proved to be ineffective. In Balochistan the Khan of Kalat was incapable of stopping peripheral tribes such as the Marri and Bugti from raiding the plains. Even more problematic were the Khan's attempts, with British backing, to increase his authority over the tribes making up his confederacy and the chiefs (*sardars*) that led them, attempts which provoked rebellion and civil war.[10] Further north, too, the policy of leaving large areas of tribal territory unadministered led to increasing disorder. Violence in the Pushtun tribal areas increased because of resentment against the government's retaliatory raiding and such events as the Mutiny of 1857 and the Second Anglo-Afghan war in 1879 (Caroe 1983:351–64; Spain 1979:10–11).

After their second war with Afghanistan the British attempted to assert greater control over the tribal areas. While it took different forms in different areas the fundamental ingredients of their new forward policy were the concentration of military force in the tribal areas and patronage of tribal leaders but also autonomy and self government according to 'tribal custom' as codified in the colonial Frontier Crimes Regulations (Caroe 1986:376). Forts were built and troops stationed in a number of strategic points in the tribal areas, and legal borders were established delineating areas of sovereignty for the governments of India, Iran, Kalat, and Afghanistan.

The forward policy, as conceived and implemented by Robert Sandeman, was successful in Balochistan. In 1876 Sandeman negotiated a treaty between the colonial government, on the one hand, and the Khan of Kalat and his sardars, on the other, which reaffirmed the status of the Khan as a leader of an independent though subordinate allied state. The treaty broke with the past, however, in that it permitted the British to station troops in Balochistan and it increased the authority of the sardars who received annual subsidies contingent upon their loyalty to the Khan and their effectiveness in policing their territories (Swidler 1969:52; Baloch 1987:140–1). From that time on, the financial, political, and military support of the colonial government gave Baloch tribal leaders the incentive and the ability to keep the peace. After some initial conflict similar arrangements

[10] Thornton 1895:62; Baloch 1985:224; Baloch 1987:135.

were worked out in the Pushtun areas of what is now northern Balochistan (Thornton 1895).[11]

Similar attempts to pacify Pushtun areas further north met with considerably less success. Forts were built in strategic areas[12] but penetration of tribal areas was never accompanied by an effective administrative arrangement, and so the occupation remained difficult and tenuous. Chronic small-scale attacks and raids were punctuated by more serious uprisings. In 1897 and 1898 Pushtun tribes attacked government forces throughout the frontier, and 60,000 troops were required to extinguish the 'conflagration' (Mills 1979). In 1919 and 1920 a campaign to suppress an uprising by the Mahsud tribe required 80,000 troops and cost several times more than the Third Anglo-Afghan War which had been the catalyst of the fighting. In the 1930s the independence movement in India was manifested as unrest in Pushtun tribal areas and urban centers. Indeed, despite more political reforms and a more vigorous application of the forward policy, there was less security in the Pushtun frontier in the last decade of British rule than ever before (Spain 1979:17–21). Poullada (1979:132) imagines the British efforts to exert control over the Pushtun tribes this way:

> The proud Pushtuns, safely ensconced in their mountains, met the forward policies with ferocious guerrilla warfare and simply smiled with contempt at the periodic withdrawals. In the end British administration contented itself with a policy of containment and reprisal.

Colonial and Contemporary Stereotypes

These briefly were the historical circumstances in which the British formulated their opinions of Baloch and Pushtun. The attitude of individual Britons toward the peoples of the frontier ranged from romantic admiration to utter revulsion. Lindholm (1980:355–6) has suggested that differences in the attitudes of colonial observers were

[11] This is not to say that the Baloch and southern Pushtun areas were constantly peaceful. Throughout the first two decades of the 20th century the northerly Zhob district was beset by small-scale raiding and occasionally large scale attacks on government troops by various combinations of Pushtun tribes from the area and from Afghanistan. In 1918 opposition to recruiting for the military led to a major uprising among the Baloch Marri tribe, and the government also had to put down occasional insurgencies in southern Baloch areas (General Staff of India 1929:28–42; 1930:20–43).

[12] Notably in the Kurram Valley, Gomal, and Tochi.

a function of the political role they played on the frontier. Those who confronted the frontier tribes while enforcing the more aggressive forward policy developed negative attitudes, while administrators under close borders allowed the tribes more autonomy and had friendlier relations with them. Through time, however, British assessments of the people of the frontier took on a certain consistency which Yapp (1980:471) characterizes as ambivalence combined with the assumptions that their faults were caused by their institutions and could be alleviated by humanitarian reforms. In his study of the colonial literature on the Pushtun, Anderson (1992:106–7) has suggested this conformity was a symptom of an intellectual involution which took place as the social distance between the British and Pushtun increased with the professionalization and routinization of the colonial administration and as a result of the literary techniques of citing, reusing, and updating previous sources.[13] He also points out that the ethnographic material on the frontier tribes was produced not by academics but by political administrators, and that much of the published material was in the form of personal memoirs (*ibid.*:94, 105).

A representative work in this genre and one which provides a concise statement of British attitudes towards the border tribes is Thomas Holdich's account of his twenty-year career as a military officer and surveyor on the western frontier.[14] According to Holdich:

> The Baluch is easier to deal with and to control than the Pathan, owing to his tribal organization, and his freedom from bigoted fanaticism or blind allegiance to his priest. He respects and honours the chief of his clan, who possesses far greater authority in the tribal councils than is the case with the Pathan. The Pathan is a republican of the worst type. He is a law unto himself, and although he is very much under the influence of the Mullah, he has always an eye to business, even in his most fanatical outbursts. Both are warlike and predatory, but their methods of fighting differ essentially, even when engaged in intertribal warfares. The Baluch fights openly, and faces the enemy boldly. There is a rough form of chivalry amongst the Baluch warriors, who are in most respects worthy descendants of the Arab

[13] Anderson depicts this process as one of degeneration in which earlier, 'more nuanced' insights of mostly Scottish administrators gave way to the 'thin and ironic' ones of their successors (1992:92). I would argue that the process was in fact a refinement of insight which reflected increased experience in a situation in which all involved came to know the capabilities and limitations of the players. This situation was just one in a larger setting in which colonial rule was increasingly on the defensive as Indians turned its ideologies and institutions against it.

[14] Embree calls Holdich 'one of the ablest of the frontier officials in the late nineteenth century' (1979:34).

conquerors of Asia ... [T]he Pathan will make use of any stratagem or subterfuge that suits his purpose. He will shoot his own relations just as soon as his enemy, possibly sooner—and he will shoot them from behind [Holdich 1909:184–5].

Though this statement lacks the subtlety that characterizes the observations of some of the administrators whose writings focus more specifically on the tribes (see for example Bruce 1900; Howell 1931), it does reflect aspects of their views, and it is consistent with the observations of many other colonial officials, missionaries, and journalists.[15]

Holdich's statement is also representative in that it focuses on '"character" with its "natural" locus in tribalism' (Anderson 1992:99). In essence, he and other colonial observers portray Pushtun social organization as egalitarian, and Pushtun themselves as entrepreneurial, religious, and treacherous, even towards their relatives; and they portray Baloch social organization as oligarchic and Baloch as forthright and especially concerned with honor. As suggested above, these images from the colonial period resemble common stereotypes in contemporary Balochistan. As is the case in the colonial literature, not all the Baloch and Pushtun I met in Quetta narrow their experiences into stereotypes but those that did characterize Pushtun as entrepreneurial and religious, and Baloch as having strong tribal values and concern for honor.

In the contemporary setting the value attached to these 'objective' traits can vary, however. A number of studies have shown that the denotative or core traits that make up stereotypes are most widely shared (even by members of the group against whom the stereotype is directed) and persistent, whereas their connotations, the values placed on those traits, vary through time and among individuals (Cauthern *et al.* 1971:110, 119).[16] The positive connotation that can

[15] See, for example, Elphinstone 1815:162–3, 247–53; Postans 1843:43–50; Bellew 1864:209–10; Hunter 1871:4–5; Hughes 1877:43; Oliver 1890:23–7; Thorburn 1894:206, 219; Thornton 1895:110; Mills 1897:5–8; Churchill 1898:3–6; Pennell 1909:33–4, 47–50; and General Staff of India 1933:7–8.

[16] Kurin's study contrasting Punjabis and Urdu-speaking Mohajirs in Pakistan effectively illustrates this point. The two groups share a set of concepts for defining the person which include spirit (*ruh*), energy (*nafs*), and intellect (*'aql*) and they agree that Mohajirs are characterized by more developed *'aql* and Punjabis by more concentrated *nafs*. Both traits can take on both negative and positive connotations, *'aql* being associated with a literate and mannered way of life but one also characterized by timidity and delusion while *nafs* is associated with traits such as strength, health, and realism but also with violence and illiteracy (1988:232). For a more polarized example see Guha's (1983:14–15) discussion of the fine and the terrible.

be attached to the entrepreneur is that he is industrious, the negative connotation is that he is venal; the positive connotation that can be attached to the man with strong tribal values is that he is principled, the negative connotation is that he is detached from the practical aspects of life. Thus several Pushtun informants asserted that their group's economic success is due to hard work, an aptitude for education, and their lack of regard for 'backward' tribal institutions. On the other hand, their economic success is interpreted by Baloch as a sign of greediness and a lack of honor. For example, one Baloch informant said most Pushtun would kill their own brother for money, an assessment which combines greed, a want of tribal values, and the sense that Pushtun are at war with their relatives.

Conversely, several of my Pushtun informants depicted the lack of Baloch economic success as caused by their laziness. 'All they care about is their honor' a Pushtun bus driver told me. Baloch themselves often identify the high value placed on honor as characteristically Baloch. Several Baloch informants told me, for example, that no Baloch woman would ever dishonor herself by working as a prostitute, even if she was destitute. While some Baloch are highly critical of the power of hereditary tribal leaders, most view loyalty to these sardars as an expression of tribal values and therefore honorable. Pushtun informants described it as a symptom of their backwardness and subservience. 'They will even kiss the hand of their sardar' one Pushtun said of the Baloch. This is not to say that Pushtun do not value honor (indeed, feuding among Pushtun is acted out through the discourse of honor), nor Baloch economic success; it is a matter of definitions and priorities with members of groups selecting certain traits, some of which are aspects of wider regional culture, to exemplify perceived differences with others.[17]

From Stereotypes to Social Organization

Given these consistencies in the stereotypes of the colonial and postcolonial eras, it holds that such generalizations, while not entirely accurate, are not simply random, and the question then becomes what are their historical and social foundations. My thesis is that these different stereotypes result from differences in the social

[17] Until early this century (and perhaps later) it was also a custom for Pushtun in Afghanistan to kiss the hands of the royal family (Stewart 1973:132).

organization of the two peoples, differences which are summarized in the observation that Pushtun groupings are egalitarian and Baloch hierarchic. I suggest that these aspects of Baloch and Pushtun social structure predate the colonial period, that they in part shaped the historic trajectory of colonialism among the two groups, and that, while they may have been altered during the colonial period, they persist. To explore the differences in their social organization I will initially examine contemporary anthropological descriptions of the two groups, and I will then examine some of the historical evidence that suggests the features they describe are not simply recent developments.

Baloch and Pushtun are culturally and socially similar. Both inhabit ecological zones in which agriculture is possible only in limited areas, though among the Baloch pastoralism has assumed much greater importance than among the Pushtun.[18] On the basis of shared descent and territory, segmentary groupings are established in both societies, and those relationships are expressed in the cultural values of patrilineality, honor, and obligation to provide protection (and hospitality) to family and guests (Barth 1981:94–7). Most Baloch like most Pushtun are Sunni Muslims. In Quetta the two peoples are interpenetrated, with marriages, partnerships, and friendships being formed between them, and in the rural areas, as discussed below, it is not uncommon for lineages in Baloch tribes to claim Pushtun origins. Despite these similarities and interconnections, there are significant differences in the socio-political structure of Baloch and Pushtun tribes, differences which are summarized in the observation that Baloch tribes are relatively centralized and hierarchic and Pushtun ones relatively decentralized and egalitarian.

To say that Baloch society is hierarchic and Pushtun society egalitarian is not to make a categorical distinction. Rather, as both colonial observers and anthropologists have noted, forces acting toward both centralization and decentralization are at work in the two societies.[19] Among both groups segmentary tribes (which themselves can

[18] This is especially true of the eastern Pushtun, i.e., those inhabiting the Pakistan–Afghanistan frontier and therefore the most relevant for this study (Arlinghaus 1988:172–3).

[19] Both Elphinstone (1815) and Bruce (1900) were aware of the tendencies toward centralization and decentralization in the frontier tribes. Salzman (1983) discusses the phenomenon in a contemporary Baloch tribe. The theme of countervailing or cyclical manifestations of hierarchy and equality is a long-standing one in anthropology. See for example Leach (1965); Beals and Siegel (1966); Alavi (1972); Comaroff (1982); and Ortner (1989).

vary in form through time and space) are found in some areas while in others more hierarchical, feudal or semi-feudal forms of social organization prevail, though among them, too, segmentary principles may be at work.[20] Yet it appears that ecological, structural, and historical factors militate toward hierarchy among Baloch and toward decentralization among Pushtun. This is reflected in the fact that contemporary ethnographers consistently highlight the extreme individualism and radical equality prevalent among Pushtun which contrasts with the nested hierarchy of status and authority in Baloch groupings which culminates in the office of the sardar.

The practical manifestation of equality among Pushtun is the *jirga* or council of elders.

> The relationship between members of a council is one of equals; with no speaker or leader; the equality is emphasized by circular seating on the ground and the equal right of all to speak. The body does not finalize its decisions in a vote: discussion and negotiation continue until the decision is unopposed and thereby unanimous and binding as a decision by each participant . . . . It allows groups of men to arrive at joint decisions without compromising any participant's independence; it produces binding corporate decisions about concerted action without dissembling the structure of egalitarian balanced segments through the introduction of any one's right to give commands [Barth 1969:121–2].

Though eligibility for membership in the jirga varies between regions, at minimum it requires patrilineal descent within a Pushtun tribe.[21] The ownership of land looms large in this regard. Even in areas where land has little economic value and the independent tribesman's income comes from such 'imaginative' sources as smuggling, robbery, or government payoffs to desist from those pursuits, land ownership allows laying claim to the tribal charter (Ahmed 1980:264). In Pushtun society land is individually owned and ideally passed from a father to his sons among whom it is divided equally; descent units are therefore territorial units.[22] Before the economies

[20] See Ahmed (1980:116–24) for a discussion of the types of social organization found in Pushtun society, and Pastner (1978) and Spooner (1983 & 1988:622–9) for a discussion of Baloch society.

[21] Ahmed 1976:74; 1983:91; 143–7; Spain 1962:50; Rittenberg 1979:69.

[22] Barth 1981; Ahmed 1980:213–19; and van Steenbergen 1996:258. Anderson (1983:130–1) points out, however, that individual ownership sets up a disjunction between the territorial unit and the kinship unit. 'Particular segments may decline and merge with adjacent ones, or grow and divide, simply by refocusing on another ancestor, for *khels* are not at any level corporate with respect to land tenure. Real property is owned by individuals, inheriting from former proprietors, each constituting with its own household an independent economic unit separately endowed with the same types of resources as any other.'

of the region were extensively monetized, if not still in some areas such as Swat, only those who owned land were considered Pushtun because without land one would have had to subordinate oneself to another by working on his land, and in Pushtun society, to be another's client means bearing 'inferior, non-tribesman serf status' (Barth 1969:124). In other words, in some cases the ideology of equality among Pushtun is so strong that once a man is no longer able to demonstrate his autonomy as an independent landlowner he is no longer considered to be Pushtun (Lindholm 1982:74, 91).

Just as the emphasis on equality among Pushtun is unusual among tribal peoples in the Islamic world, so too is the degree of hierarchy in Baloch tribes as manifested in the level of authority and status held by Baloch sardars (Spooner 1988:625).

> The Marri tribe and its sections must be understood as a structure of groups and leaders, and the crucial feature of membership in a group is the relationship of subordination to its leader .... The *sardar* is the central and unifying leader, who by his existence creates the Marri tribe and who for formal purposes is regarded as the font of all legitimate power in the tribe [Pehrson 1966:20].

Their wealth (from personally owned lands and the taxes they levy on their tribesmen and clients), their ability to determine who holds office at sub-tribal levels, and their formal connections with external political structures give these sardars considerable power to settle disputes and determine events within the tribe (Swidler 1969: 152). Indeed, the centrality of the sardar is such that recognition of his authority can initiate a process by which outsiders are incorporated into his tribe. Thus, most Baloch tribes have accretions of lineages from other Baloch tribes or even other ethnic groups around a core of lineages with recognized descent from the group's patronym.

Even in areas, such as Makran, where patrilineal tribes have little importance in peoples' lives, other types of patron–client relationships play a determining role in social organization, and, as Barth points out, those relationships take on different significance than they do in Pushtun society.

> Judged by Pathan standards, clientship places a man among the despised failures, subordinates among independent commoners. Among Baluch, on the other hand, self-respect and recognition as an honorable commoner does not require this degree of assertion and autonomy; the costs by Baluch standards of being a client of a chief and a nobleman are very slight. [Barth 1969:125]

This is reflected in land ownership in Baloch society which is characterized by flexible share-cropping relations and, in the past, various types of communal ownership (Swidler 1973:302–3; van Steenbergen 1996:154–7).

Baluch society differs from Pushtun society in much the same way as Kapferer says Asian, hierarchical states differ from Western, egalitarian ones. Deriving his analysis from the work of Dumont, Kapferer argues that in hierarchical societies individuals and groups are seen to be incorporated within and determined by holistic principles. In those societies political (not religious) authority is the encompassing, unifying force which subsumes, orders, and makes whole, otherwise weak or destructive individuals and groups (1988:211). By contrast, in the ideology of egalitarian societies, Kapferer says, the individual precedes society and is the fundamental element of it. The danger to egalitarian individuals is that they will be absorbed and homogenized by more inclusive orders such as the state (*ibid.*:168, 187). In egalitarian societies much is made of the boundaries around groups, i.e., the differences which distinguish who may be considered the same and thus equal. The high degree of egalitarianism among Pushtun is also marked by a need to distinguish between Pushtun and non-Pushtun, giving Pushtun society its exclusive quality. By contrast, like the hierarchical state Kapferer describes, the Baloch are able to incorporate non-Baloch if they are subordinate to hierarchical authority, i.e., if they acknowledge the authority of the encompassing social order the sardar embodies.

Subsistence, Structure, and Politics

Again it is important to point out that in both societies countervailing forces are also at work. Some Pushtun lineages or individuals have greater power than others, for example, and Baloch 'commoners', especially nomads, can avoid the authority of tribal leaders by keeping their distance from them (Pehrson 1966:27). Yet, hierarchy and equality are worked out in different ways in the two groups as a result of both internal and external factors. Beginning with the cultural ecology of the two groups this section examines some of these factors and the relations between them.

As suggested above, pastoral nomadism has been a more important subsistence strategy for Baloch than for Pushtun. Until quite

recently the subsistence strategies of most Baloch combined small-scale agriculture with semi-nomadic or transhumant pastoralism (and in some instances raiding or wage labor).[23] Even in areas where most of the population is settled, full-time nomadic pastoralists played and continue to play the vital roles of linking isolated populations and utilizing otherwise unproductive land. Nomadism is not only an economic but a political strategy, however. It can be a political-military adaptation by weaker groups that have been marginalized or sought to avoid domination by more powerful settled groups, or conversely, nomads can themselves be the dominant political force in society (Irons 1974:647–54; Asad 1973). Both are in some sense true in the case of the Baloch since they historically existed on the margins of Persian civilization though, in the areas they have inhabited, leaders with genealogical or political links to pastoral tribes have tended to dominate settled agricultural populations.[24] Spooner (1987:63) suggests that nomadism 'is still thought of as the genuine Baluch life, which embodies the authentic Baluch virtues of honesty, loyalty, faith, hospitality, asylum for refugees, and so on'.

While pastoral nomadism is an element in the subsistence strategies of the eastern Pushtun, and more so among the southeastern tribes, it does not appear to be central to their social structure or ideology. Nomads were a minor element in the Durrani tribes which dominated Afghanistan's political structure from the eighteenth century until recent decades (Khazanov 1984:273; Elphinstone 1969:355). While there was a considerable flow of transhumant nomads from the Afghan highlands to the Indus plains until the creation of Pakistan, most of them originated in the lands to the west of the frontier tribes with whom the British dealt. These nomads were notably different from Baloch pastoral nomads in that they combined pastoralism with trade or money-lending, and many were primarily traders rather than herdsmen (Scholz 1996:197).[25] The frontier Pushtun were able to exploit their strategic position

[23] See Swidler 1980; Pehrson 1966:11–16; and Baluchistan 1906a:108–9.

[24] Swidler 1992; Spooner 1988:607; Salzman 1978; Khazanov 1984:223, Baluchistan 1906b:48.

[25] Robinson reported in the 1930s that these nomadic traders brought animals and animal products, carpets, fruits, and drugs from the highlands and exchanged them for such industrial products as kerosene, matches, cloth, shoes, sugar, and tea (1978:23–4). In a more recent study Ferdinand reported that though restricted, such trade was still being carried out thirty years later (1962:156).

along the passes between the mountains and the plains by raiding or extracting tribute from those engaged in that trade. Dupree (1980:166–9) notes that nomads fill similar social and ecological roles in Afghanistan as they do in Balochistan, and that Pushtun like Baloch, romanticize their nomadic past. Nevertheless the core values of Pushtun derive more from the notion of being primordial Muslims (Anderson 1984), and from the code of honor and revenge that result from *tarboorwali*, the rivalry between cousins for land, status, and power (Ahmed 1980:91–2).[26]

Those seeking correlations between ecological factors and social organization provide some insight into the issues raised here. Lindholm, citing Black-Michaud, argues that nomadic societies tend to generate larger groups which act as units than do sedentary peoples among whom individuals act with greater independence (Lindholm 1982:89; see also Spooner 1973:25). Such is the case among Baloch since patrilineal descent, complemented by contract, is the medium through which people form nomadic camps (and obtain land tenure and cultivation rights). These kin also establish local leaders who make decisions, mediate disputes, and are incorporated into the hierarchical structure of the tribe (Swidler 1969:102–6, 142; Pehrson 1966:20–2). Tribal hierarchies may also be partially determined by cultural ecology because where it is necessary to coordinate annual migration cycles or mediate relations between sedentary and nomadic populations paramount leaders tend to be present in nomadic groups (Spooner 1973:35; Lindholm 1982:90). Until quite recently among Baloch tribes with lands in the highlands and the Kachhi plains the role of the sardars was important in this regard.

Another difference in the cultural ecology of nomadic and settled peoples is their ability to handle scarcity. Whereas nomads possess a naturally increasing resource and the ability to divide their communities with relative ease, sedentary agriculturalists such as the Pushtun face much stricter limits. This situation, in which land = wealth = status, land is limited, and one's agnatic kin are one's primary competitors for access to land, gives rise to the institution of tarboorwali which shapes both tribal structure and 'character' among Pushtun (Lindholm 1982:75–7; Ahmed 1980:5–7). It is also a 'push' factor giving rise to extensive out-migration from Pushtun areas, another aspect of Pushtun social life that shapes stereotypes about them.

[26] Another important component of the Pushtun tribal code of honor is *tor*, the chastity of women, a core value of Baloch and other Muslim peoples.

External Political Power and Tribal Structures

Nomadic pastoralism may be sufficient but it is not necessary for the creation of hierarchy among tribal peoples, and attempts to explain the development of hierarchical structures generally emphasize relations between nomads and outsiders. Salzman, for example, explains the stratified segmentary structure of the Baloch Yarahmadzai tribe by their relations to another ethnic group's expanding 'quasi-feudal proto-state' in the nineteenth century (Salzman 1983:277). To resist becoming subordinate to that more centralized power the Yarahmadzai established sardars as military leaders and negotiators through which they organized themselves on a more sustained basis than they otherwise could, he suggests. Limiting the analysis to specific events in the last century begs the question of how virtually all Baloch tribes have achieved this level of hierarchy in much the same form, however. Rather, long-standing contacts with centralized authority in Iran (and India) have contributed to the strain toward hierarchy in Baloch society, a tendency which increased during the colonial period (Baloch 1987:141).

Pushtun tribes, too, are potentially made hierarchical as a result of external political forces. Elphinstone (1815:163) noted, for example, that Pushtun tribes most under the influence of the Afghan king tended to have a hierarchical structure and hereditary leaders. This was not always the case, however, since agnatic rivalry and the institution of powerful jirgas undermine the authority of such leaders and perpetuate decentralization (Ahmed 1980:95–6). This has given Pushtun tribes their amorphous quality, and, as Yapp's quote at the beginning of this paper suggests, their ability to resist outsiders.

These tendencies shaped the history of events in the frontier. This can be discerned in the words of Richard Bruce, an assistant to Sandeman and advocate of the forward policy. When he and Sandeman first began to work with the Baloch Bugti tribe its sardar lacked the influence to stop renegade subsections from raiding, and it was, he contended, the support of the government which allowed the sardars to develop their authority within their tribes.[27]

> [T]he greatest of all changes brought about under Sandeman's regime . . . was the setting on their legs of the hereditary chiefs and maliks, Pathan as

[27] Nina Swidler has observed in a personal communication that the Bugti *sardar* may have found it expedient to represent himself to the British as having limited influence in his tribe.

well as Beluch, supporting them and working through them, and bringing them into line with ourselves in all matters connected with the good administration of the frontier; at the same time that he exercised a healthy control and supervision over their actions. It is to this policy that they owe the influence they at present possess, and were our support to be withdrawn their power and authority would soon dwindle [Bruce 1979:19].

The fact that Sandeman and Bruce successfully pacified the southern Pushtun tribes using the same measures that had been successful among the Baloch tribes indicates the potential malleability of Pushtun tribes.[28] Employing the same methods with which he and Sandeman accommodated the Baloch, Bruce was even able to open temporarily the Gomal Pass in Waziristan, the territory of some of the most intractable Pushtun tribes. His success with those tribes was not to be long-lived, however. Among the northern Pushtun tribes the ultimate power of the leaders the British appointed and/or promoted was their personal standing in the tribe, not their ties to the government, and, in fact, such ties made them vulnerable to those preaching opposition to the infidel outsiders on the basis of Islam or ethnicity (Ahmed 1978:167; Caroe 1986:376).

It is also necessary to examine the political geography of the region to understand the differences between the northern and southern tribes in this regard. Holdich (1909:186) pointed out that the latter were strategically circumscribed by the military presence of the colonial government, unlike the former who had 'hidden means of communication with unseen supporters in the vast up land plains which stretched away to Kandahar and Kabul'. These back doors allowed the northern tribes to escape military pressure, and they also provided a convenient means by which the government of Afghanistan could aggravate the British. The situation, of course, allowed the border tribes to play the two governments off against one another and would have allowed individuals to operate in their own interests independent of the tribal hierarchy. To have made the forward policy work would have required thoroughly penetrating the northern areas, the economic and political costs of which were too great for the Government of India to bear (Howell 1979:50, 98–9; Yapp 1983:187).

[28] It is interesting to note, though, that twenty years after the southern Pushtun tribes were incorporated into the colonial administration, British administrators continued to characterize them as less hierarchical and more democratic than Baloch tribes (Baluchistan 1906c:67). Since that time, as I describe below, the hereditary leaders of those southern Pushtun tribes have enjoyed less authority than have their Baloch counterparts.

The Construction of Character

It is also possible to correlate these structural factors with the reoccurring generalizations about the 'character' of Pushtun and Baloch. Tarboorwali not only undermines centralization in Pushtun tribes, it also gives rise to destructive feuds between kin and the attendant pattern of betrayal from which the characterization of treacherousness is drawn. It creates an atmosphere in which 'honor lies in vengeance, not in keeping a trust' (Lindholm 1982:84).[29] Undoubtedly the international situation in which the governments of Afghanistan and British India competed to influence events in the border tribes also helped create the impression that their trustworthiness was problematic.

The fact that the two governments bid for the loyalty of the tribes must have also contributed to the British perception that the Pushtun were venal. More important in this regard is the reputation Pushtun have gained because of their activities as trading nomads and as merchants, moneylenders, and mercenaries in towns and cities throughout India. Out migration resulting from the push of ecological factors and the pull of extensive networks and traditions developed during the centuries of involvement in the trade and politics of northern India has given Pushtun the reputation of being ambitious and hardworking but also shrewd and unethical, stereotypes commonly associated with stranger communities and middlemen minorities (Bonacich and Modell 1980:19; Kronenfeld 1985:14).[30]

Finally the Pushtun reputation for religious zeal, too, is a product of both structure and history. Anderson (1984:274) has suggested that a perceived congruence between being a tribesman and being Muslim is at the heart of Pushtun identity. The Ghilzai tribesmen he describes see themselves as exemplary Muslims since the putative

[29] Ahmed describes *tarboorwali* as 'neither chivalric nor romantic. It does not occur at an appointed place and time with selected weapons and roughly equal chances of victory but may be a shot in the back at the least expected time' (1980:182). See also Barth (1981).

[30] Spain (1962:22–3) provides a description which evokes these 'classic' stereotypes: 'You will find Pathans all over Pakistan and India. They man coastal vessels between obscure Indian Ocean ports, they serve as police officers in East Bengal, household servants in Bombay and New Delhi, customs agents on the Malabar Coast, gun-runners in Kashmir, and bank guards in Benares. For a hundred years there has been scarcely a village in all the subcontinent that did not know the Pathan money-lender, with his bag of coins, his long knife, his wicked smile, and his interest rates ranging upwards from fifty per cent a month [Spain 1962:22–3]'.

ancestor of all Pushtun, Qais, received Islam directly from the prophet Muhammad.[31] There are however, tensions between these two aspects of Pushtun identity since Islam and tribalism generate different values, institutions, and lines of unity and division (*ibid.*:280–6; Ahmed 1976). Of particular importance in this regard is the role played by religious figures (*mullahs* or *faqirs*) who stand outside the tribal charter and can thus suppress tribal conflicts and focus opposition on external threats to autonomy. This, of course, led the British to perceive opposition to their rule as Pushtun fanaticism (King 1900:112).

The reputed traits of Baloch 'character' are those frequently associated with nomads. These extend from ecological and cultural factors which encourage men of action, movement, and force (Spooner 1973:36–7). Given that cohesive kinship units often function as the core of nomadic camps and allegiance to sardars provides a route to tribal membership, the configuration of honor in Baloch society places an emphasis on displaying loyalty and keeping one's word. The eclectic, relatively fluid nature of Baloch tribes contributes, perhaps, to the fact that, like many other nomadic groups in the Middle East, Baloch do not equate being Muslim with strict observance of the practices and rituals prescribed by the Shari'a (*ibid.*:39; Baluchistan 1906d:73). It should also be noted, however, that orthodox Islam has been promoted by some of the Khans of Kalat and is a growing force in some Baloch areas (Baloch 1996:231, 243).

Stereotypes and Routes to Mobilization

In contemporary Pakistan the expansion of the state and market relations has lessened the importance of tribal institutions in shaping the social life of many Baloch and Pushtun. Yet the features of the two societies described above continue to provide individual Pushtun and Baloch the networks, strategies, identities, and expectations with which they approach these changed circumstances. It is for this reason that stereotypes drawn initially from the tribal life of the two groups persist in the urban setting.

[31] This perception is not necessarily shared by urbanized ethnic-nationalists as evident in the politician Wali Khan's oft-quoted response when he was asked to name his political priorities. 'I have been a Pukhtun for 5000 years, a Muslim for 1500 years, and a Pakistani for 40 years' he said.

Martin Orans' concept of 'rank paths' or 'avenues of mobility' (Orans 1965:123–36; 1971:89–100) provides a useful starting point for a discussion of the post-colonial era. Orans suggests that subordinate ethnic or caste groups mobilize along different paths or routes in order to adopt or match the successes of those dominating them. The two routes to mobilization he discusses in most detail are the political route and the economic route. He argues that in general the political route to mobilization engenders greater solidarity than does the economic route which tends to result in individual, not group, success. He goes on to qualify these broad conclusions by observing that the degree of economic stratification within the group will influence whether or not political mobilization promotes solidarity since political competition between interest groups or classes also can be divisive (Orans 1971:99–100). He observes, too, that the state can enter the picture in ways that decrease the solidarity of groups by undermining their indigenous institutions or by pressuring them to adopt the symbols of the nation; or, conversely, the state may promote solidarity by creating institutions or offices individuals have access to by virtue of their membership in the group (Orans 1971:149).

The concept of routes to mobilization is pertinent to the discussion of contemporary Pakistan, because in its first decades Pushtun and Baloch have occupied marginal, subordinate positions within the state, and in their efforts to mobilize themselves they have confronted one another as well as the country's dominant ethnic groups. Especially in the province of Balochistan where the two groups share an ethnic boundary, historical circumstances and the social organization of each group have propelled their members along different routes to mobilization. Though neither route is entirely exclusive of the other, in post-colonial Balochistan Baloch have followed a predominantly political route, while Pushtun have followed an economic route to mobilization.

Pushtun economic success is widely evident in Balochistan. Pushtun merchants replaced many of the Hindus and Sikhs who controlled the wholesale and retail trade in northern Balochistan (including Quetta) before they left for India during Partition (Scholz 1996:200). The position of Pushtun in the commercial life of the region is enhanced by the fact that Pushtun tribes straddle the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, giving them control of important trade and smuggling routes. Relative to Baloch, Pushtun have also been successful in contracting, construction, and the pro-

fessions; and Pushtun farmers have taken the lead in developing commercial orchard crops, most notably apples.

Pushtun economic success is not limited to the Pushtun areas of Balochistan or the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). As described, because of their strategic location along the most important trade routes to India as well as their historic ties to various regimes in northern India, Pushtun have developed networks and skills that give them access to economic niches throughout the subcontinent. In Balochistan during the nineteenth century a thriving colony of Pushtun traders in Kalat known as the Babis managed 'a considerable transit trade between Sind, Bombay, and Kandahar' (Masson 1974:107).[32] Presently Pushtun control much of the bus transportation in Karachi, and in an economic survey of transporters in Quetta several Pushtun bus owners said they earned the money to buy their vehicles through such activities as lending money or selling cloth and tobacco (*nashwar*) in other parts of Pakistan and India (Titus 1991:167–83). Pushtun are also relatively well-represented in Pakistan's civil bureaucracy and military.

The Political Route

In Balochistan's politics, however, Pushtun are in a much weaker position. This is largely a factor of Pakistan's political geography. Pushtun officially constitute around 25 percent of the province's population, and their numbers have allowed Baloch to dominate whatever open political life the center has permitted.[33] Except for the darkest days of Zia's martial law regime when military figures were appointed, over the past 25 years either the Governor or the Chief Minister of Balochistan has been Baloch. Those offices were held by Pushtun for a combined total of around three years in that period.[34] Baloch political success is not simply a matter of numbers,

[32] See also Hughes 1877:30–1; Gordon 1855; Barth 1969.

[33] This figure is derived from statistics regarding language spoken in the home (*madre zuban*) since the government of Pakistan does not collect figures on ethnic affiliation (Pakistan 1984).

[34] The head of the Pushtun Barozai tribe was chief minister of Balochistan for a year between 1976 and 1977, and in July 1991 Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan of the Jogezai tribe became governor of the province, a post he held until July 1993. Both men were appointed to office by Islamabad.

however, and it is necessary to examine both regional and structural factors to understand the dynamics that underlie it.

Political ideologies in Pakistan are articulated through three basic themes: Pakistani nationalism, ethnic-nationalism, and Islam. Since 96 percent of Pakistanis are Muslims, these are not, by and large, mutually exclusive identities. Rather, the core values of the country's political parties and movements are in one of these fields, though from there each makes ideological extensions or alliances in the other fields. The rationale of ethnic-nationalism is socio-cultural particularism, and ethnic-nationalists in Pakistan demand greater political, economic, and cultural autonomy for their group or region. For Baloch and Pushtun ethnic-nationalists the current borders with Iran and Afghanistan, imposed and maintained by outsiders, create a sense of being unnaturally divided and weakened. This sense of fragmentation is aggravated by the fact that in Pakistan they are also divided among a number of administrative units. Not only do Pushtun inhabit large parts of Balochistan and the NWFP; for example, some tribes live in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) or Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA), and the situation is similar for Baloch.[35] The call to create a Pushtun homeland (Pushtunkhwa), defined variously as a state that would unify all Pushtun in Pakistan and Afghanistan or as a province that would unite the Pushtun in Pakistan, has been a persistent feature of Pushtun politics, and similar aspirations for a 'Greater Balochistan' have been a major undercurrent in Baloch politics.

The government of Pakistan, wary of any demands by minorities that would lead to a restructuring or decentralization of the state, has vigorously opposed these ethnic-nationalist movements but they have also been undermined by the social forces we have examined. In the case of the Pushtun, ethnic-nationalists' efforts to unite people on a more inclusive basis than tribalism have been thwarted by the appeal of Islam. This was the case in 1947 when the Muslim League overwhelmed the Frontier Congress and its call to create a Pushtun state (Rittenberg 1988:243–4). In recent decades the Pushtun nationalist movement, as represented by the National Awami Party (NAP) and its successor, the Awami National Party (ANP), has been contained in the NWFP by the Jamiat 'Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), an Islamic party, and Pakistani nationalist parties (various avatars of

[35] In the provinces Pakistan civil and criminal law prevails while in FATA and PATA tribal and customary law holds sway.

the Muslim League and the Pakistan People's Party). The appeal of Islam has been even greater among Pushtun in Balochistan where the JUI has dominated Pushtun electoral politics until quite recently.[36]

Among Baloch, ethnic-nationalism has had a somewhat different history. The institution of the powerful sardar in Baloch tribes has created a tendency for powerful and dynamic leaders to emerge at the ethnic-national level as well. A number of Baloch sardars have entered politics and built followings beyond their tribes by advocating Baloch nationalism. First as leaders of the NAP and subsequently along divergent paths, throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s Baloch tribal/political figures such as Sardar Ataullah Mengal, Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, Nawab Khair Bukhsh Marri, and Ghous Bukhsh Bizenjo[37] provided the medium through which the discourse of Baloch nationalism was carried out. Even young, middle-class Baloch who opposed 'tribalism' articulated their position by aligning with one or another of these men.

Though tribal identities and tribal structures are thus a dimension of Baloch ethnic-nationalism, they retain considerable autonomy. In the world of electoral politics, for example, even sardars who do not present themselves as ethnic-nationalists are able to convert their tribal standing into political power. The largest group of successful candidates in Balochistan's elections is consistently those elected as independents, nearly all of whom are sardars (Yusufzai 1993). Indeed, it is the autonomy of sardars rather than the appeal of Islam that has undermined the Baloch ethnic-nationalist movement. While many sardars distance themselves from the Baloch nationalist movement, those who have led it have been strong personalities with their own tribal constituencies. During the 1970s personal differences among them developed into serious and destructive rifts (Harrison 1981).

Nevertheless, it can be argued that Baloch ethnic-nationalists have achieved certain victories in Balochistan. Though it did not have the support of all Baloch and was contained by the government with relative ease, their armed insurrection against the central government in the 1970s gained them a certain amount of respect as well as attention. One of their main demands was for greater representa-

[36] The first time a Pushtun nationalist party won more seats than the JUI in an election in Balochistan was October, 1993.

[37] Bizenjo was not technically the sardar of his tribe but he was in a collateral line for the sardarship. One informant knowledgeable in tribal matters told me his uncle had usurped the office from him.

tion of Balochistanis in the provincial bureaucracy, a condition that has been met. Also, much as the PPP government did in the 1970s, the martial law government under Zia proposed a number of development projects for Balochistan and wooed the province's tribal elite.[38] The province received large amounts of aid from the international community as a result of the civil war in Afghanistan, both because of the refugees who fled there but also because of the prospect of another Baloch uprising (Ispahani 1989:69–77). While not all of this aid was directed toward Baloch areas, since most refugees were (and still are) concentrated in Pushtun areas, and while Baloch nationalists consider that which was spent inadequate fundamentally to change living conditions, a significant number of schools, irrigation works, and development projects such as the aborted Bela-to-Turbat road were initiated in Baloch areas.

Also, more Baloch than Balochistani Pushtun have been appointed to head ministries in the central government, and they appear to have been better able to capitalize on those ties. For example, despite the fact that Pushtun held the majority of seats on Quetta's city council, it elected a Baloch mayor following municipal elections in 1987, and many local observers felt that the influence of Baloch politicians in Islamabad was instrumental in the outcome. Some Pushtun tribal leaders have been among those the center has recruited. Yet, despite this support and unlike their Baloch counterparts, Pushtun tribal figures have by and large not enjoyed electoral success, losing out to *maulvis* affiliated with the JUI or middle-class Pushtun nationalists.

Since it emerges from the tribal social order, the ideal of honor reflects values and institutions that are seen as more pure than those the educated or urbanized must accept (Anderson 1983). Baloch sardars represent a bridge between the world of the tribe and that of the city, the market, and the state. They represent and symbolize the tribe, and therefore their standing is part of the tribe's honor (Ahmed 1987:38; C. Pastner 1988:249–50). Though they undoubtedly act in large part to serve their own interests, sardars are also able to articulate the concerns of Baloch in relation to the various forces assailing them in a way that emphasizes their cultural identity. The perpetuation of honor as a positive and central value among urbanized Baloch indicates, if not a greater reliance on tribal ties or institutions than Pushtun, at least that the source of Baloch

[38] Harrison 1981:169; Ali and Hussain 1986:66; Amin 1988:176–7, 203.

strength in contemporary Pakistan is their mobilization behind political figures who attain their standing initially from the tribal sphere and retain strong links to it.

Conclusion

People approach new situations with the cultural categories and institutions with which they are familiar and with which they have had success in the past. Thus features of social life that gave rise to particular generalizations about Pushtun and Baloch in the colonial era persist today. To suggest that historical forces have reinforced and even exaggerated certain aspects of Baloch and Pushtun society and cultural identity is not, of course, to imply that these are inherent or essential characteristics of these groups or the people that constitute them. Changed circumstances lead people to draw new conclusions and make use of new strategies.

Specifically, the civil war in Afghanistan and the massive displacement of people it has entailed have had profound effects on all citizens of Pakistan and especially those in the border region. Economic development (fueled in part by international aid for the Mujahadin and the large amounts of money entering the region through the drug trade), the collapse of the Soviet Union, and polarization over the question of Islam have all affected social life in western Pakistan. The influx of refugees, most of whom are Pushtun, has effectively eliminated the international boundary and created a *de facto* Pushtunkhwa in the NWFP and northern Balochistan (Noman 1990:198–9). These changes have to an extent reinforced stereotypes about Baloch and Pushtun. The refugees are closely identified with the cause of Islam, for example, and the Baloch response to their increasing presence in the economy and social life of Balochistan has been a political one, which warns against the increasing marginalization and 'red Indianization' of Baloch in their homeland (Jalbani 1992:56). Coincident with this, however, has been the growth of new classes, organizations, and political alliances that operate within but also cross-cut the two ethnic groups. Tribal affiliations increasingly give way to more encompassing ethnic, national, and religious identities though those identities too make use of or resonate with local, identities.

Those experiencing such changes and reflecting upon them in order to accommodate and take advantage of them, as well as those

striving to document the process, will identify certain aspects of the experience as representative or exemplary. Those features are used to create categories which, whether part of folk, liberal, or critical theories of knowledge, are simplifications and generalizations of complex, diverse phenomena (Mahmood and Armstrong 1992:10). We must be aware of how such categories are constructed and the role they play in the ordering of society but it is also necessary to place them in social and historical context in order to use them as the lenses they are, that is, as means of glimpsing the complexities to which they refer.

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